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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA JUNE FLANNERY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
- vs. -
JEROLD FRANK FLANNERY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce by the plaintiff against 
the deefndant. The Plaintiff and Appellant herein ap-
peals from an Order amending the Decree of Divorce 
entered on October 21, 1974, in which the Court arbi-
trarily reduced the amount of support money, property 
changes and amount of the delinquent alimony and 
support money which had been entered on the 20th day 
of November, 1974s?(Tr. 16). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court on the 20th of November, 1973 
(Tr. 16), entered a Decree of Divorce dissolving the 
bonds of matrimony and awarding to the plaintiff the 
custody of the three minor children of the parties, sub-
ject to the defendant's right of visitation, and the sum 
Case No. 
13896 
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2 
of $900.00 per month alimony and support money for 
the three minor children of the parties, and the Court 
also by said Decree awarded to the plaintiff the equity 
in the home located at 712 East 650 North, Bountiful, 
Utah, together with the furniture, fixtures and appli-
ances located therein; that plaintiff was awarded one-
half of the stocks, bonds, and savings accounts acquired 
by the parties during the marriage. By said Decree, the 
plaintiff was awarded the sum of $500 on account of 
attorney's fees incurred by said plaintiff for the use and 
benefit of her counsel in the prosecution of this action. 
That on the 21st day of February, 1974, upon mo-
tion of the plaintiff (Tr. 20), the Court made and 
entered its Order amending the Decree to conform with 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to include 
an award to the plaintiff of the 1972 Pontiac Firebird 
and Ordering same to be awarded to the plaintiff free 
and clear of all encumbrances, the defendant to pay and 
discharge any amounts due and owing on said automo-
bile. The Amendment to the Decree as modified, recites 
that the Divorce Decree remains in full force and effect 
as to all other matters therein contained. 
Thereafter, and on the 20th day of March, 1974, 
at a time when the Decree had become absolute and 
final, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause (Tr. 46) 
why the Decree of Divorce should not be modified based 
on oral statements of either the defendant or defendant's 
counsl as to the defendant's inability to pay, due to 
business reversals, alimony and support money as Or-
dered, and as to the property. Affidavits and Counter 
Affidavits were filed, together with plaintiff's memoran-
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dum (Tr. 50). Defendant did not submit a memoran-
dum, only affidavits. Plaintiff also in an attempt to settle 
the matter of the ability of the defendant to pay the 
amount of alimony and support money awarded to plain-
tiff, made a demand for production of the defendant's 
1973 income tax return which was never granted. Plain-
tiff also in an attempt to settle with the defendant made 
a proposed stipulation (Tr. 56) which was never ac-
cepted and agreed upon by the defendant. 
After several months of delay, the Court called for 
a hearing on the 8th day of August, 1974 (Tr. 74), at 
which time the Court arbitrarily insisted on the parties 
stipulating but terms were never made clear and the 
Court nevertheless set forth certain provisions and modi-
fications at that time. Thereafter, in a letter to Judge 
Swan (Tr. 76), plaintiffs attorney called the Court's 
attention that there was an arrearage of support money 
in the amount of $2751.05, that there was also an income 
tax refund amounting to $1695.05 which was then due 
and owing under the Decree of November 20, 1973, 
and which had never been modified. Plaintiff's counsel 
in the letter pointed out to the Court that he was of the 
opinion that the Court said $1600 was the arrears in-
stead of $600 which the Order amending the Decree of 
Divorue (Tr. 77) recites should be paid in the amount 
of $25 per month with no interest. The Court also arbi-
trarily and with no reason at all reduced the award of 
attorney's fees from $500 to $400 and gave to the defend-
ant all of the stocks and bonds of the parties even though 
Affidavits in evidence were submitted that the plaintiff 
worked and helped the defendant in the operation of his 
business and the acquiring of the stocks during the first 
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part of their marriage. It is from the Order Amending 
the Decree of Divorce dated October 21, 1974 (Tr. 73), 
that the plaintiff appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were intermarried on March 
5, 1948; they were residents of Davis County, State of 
Utah, and had been for more than three months pre-
ceding the filing of this action. There were born five 
children as the issue of this marriage and at the time of 
the filing of the divorce complaint there were three minor 
children still residing with the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged 
in her Complaint that defendant earned in excess of 
$26,000 per year as shown on his income tax return for 
1972; at the time the Decree was entered he showed his 
earnings to be in excess of this amount and based thereon 
the Court awarded to her $900 per month alimony and 
support money in the Decree of November 20, 1973 
(Tr. 16). Prior thereto on August 14, 1973 an Order to 
Show Cause was issued requiring the defendant to show 
cause, if any he had, why he should not pay to plaintiff 
temporary alimony and attorney's fees pending the dis-
position of this action on its merits (Tr. 4) . Defendant 
was personally served with this Order on the 15th day 
of August, and when he failed to appear in accordance 
with the Order on the 11th day of September, 1973, the 
Court issued a bench warrant (Tr. 8). Thereafter, the 
defendant appeared in the office of La Mar Duncan, 
attorney for plaintiff, and agreed upon temporary ali-
mony and support money in the sum of $900 per month 
and asked that the Bench Warrant be recalled, which 
Order was thereafter made (Tr. 6). 
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Subsequently, when the defendant failed to Answer 
the plaintiff's Complaint, summons having been served 
on him on the 20th day of August, 1973, the plaintiff, 
through her attorney caused a Notice of Hearing on 
the Complaint on its merits to be mailed to defendant 
at his business address (Tr. 11), which notice called to 
the defendant's attention that he was in default and that 
on the 20th of November, 1973, at 10:00 o'clock A.M., 
or as soon thereafter as the matter could be heard, 
plaintiff would request a default judgment and would 
ask the Court to hear her divorce action. Pursuant to 
said notice and on the 20th day of November, 1973, 
defendant being fully aware of the Complaint and the 
contents thereof, the Decree of Divorce was duly entered. 
Thereafter, the defendant did come to the office of the 
plaintiff's attorney where he stated his business was poor 
and was slacking off and he was unable to pay this 
amount of support money and asked the plaintiff's at-
tornay to compromise the Decree which had already 
been settled; at that time plaintiff's attorney advised him 
that he was not modifying the Decree, that it was based 
on his income and alimony and support money was al-
ways subject to the review of the Court but that the 
matter of the modification of the Decree would have to 
be made within the three month period as required by 
law (Tr. 32). 
In the plaintiff's own Affidavit (Tr. 36) plaintiff 
also made him aware of the conditions and provisions 
of the Decree of Divorce and defendant sometime in 
January, 1974, came to her and to the plaintiff's attorney 
to get the matter reviewed and have the Decree modi-
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fied. Defendant's attorney then entered the case and 
called plaintiff's attorney and asked that the matter be 
reviewed and the plaintiff's attorney told Mr. Hatch that 
the plaintiff refused any further negotiations and wanted 
to stand on the Decree which had been heretofore made 
and entered. 
Later on April 29, 1974, long after the Decree had 
become final, Mr. Hatch filed an affidavit setting out 
certain facts, particularly that defendant's income had 
been reduced. However, later at the time Judge Swan 
saw fit to modify this Decree, the evidence showed that 
the defendant was actually earning approximately 
$10,000 more in the year 1973 than he did in 1972 when 
he earned $26,000. Nevertheless, and without any reason 
whatsoever, except the statement that defendant's busi-
ness was slipping off, the Court reduced the amount in 
accordance therewirth and modified the Decree as set 




THE COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO 
SET ASIDE THE DECREE AS TO MONEYS THAT 
BECAME DUE AND OWING TO THE PLAINTIFF 
FROM THE DEFENDANT UNDER THE DECREE 
OF NOVEMBER 20, 1973. 
In the case of Matthews vs. Matthews, the Court 
per curiam said in 102 Utah 428, P. 434 (132 P.2d 111) 
as follows: 
"In his brief on appeal, appellant enumerates 
several contentions but they are all resolved in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the question of res adjudicata. . . . The judgment 
of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon 
the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, con-
clusive, between the same parties, upon the same 
matter directly in question in another Court." 
15 R.C.L. 951, Sec. 429. 
"The foundation principle upon which the 
doctrine of res a judicata rests is that parties ought 
not to be permitted to litigate the same issue 
more than once; that, when a right or fact has 
been judicially tried and determined by a court 
of competent purisdiction, or an opportunity for 
such trial has been given, the judgment of the 
court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be 
conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity 
with them in law or estate. * * * Public policy 
and the interest of litigants alike require that there 
be an end to litigation, and the peace and order 
of society demand that matters distinctly put in 
issue and determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction as to parties and subject matter shall 
not be retried between the same parties in any 
subsequent suit in any court." 15 R.C.L. 953, 
Sec. 430. 
In the case at bar the Defendant, as the record will 
show, was first served with a Summons and Complaint 
(Tr. 9) on the 20th of August, 1973. On that same day 
he was also served with an Order to Show Cause (Tr. 4) . 
He failed to appear for the Order to Show Cause and 
a Bench Warrant was issued. He also failed to answer 
the Summons and Complaint. In order to be sure that 
the defendant was further aware of the duty he had to 
defend this action, the plaintiff, through her attorney, 
caused to be mailed to the defendant a Notice of the 
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date set for the default hearing in which the notice 
recited that the plaintiff would proceed on the 20th day 
of November 1973, at 10:00 a.m. to apply to the Court 
for a default judgment and would ask the Court to 
hear her divorce action on its merits (Tr. 11). This 
notice was mailed to the office of the defendant and 
was never returned. Subsequently, in January of 1974, 
the defendant talked to the plaintiff about the Decree 
and also to plaintiff's attorney, and even came to the 
office of plainiff's attorney with his copy of the Decree 
which was mailed to him after its entry. A copy of it 
was also thereafter mailed to Mr. Orrin Hatch, who at 
this late date entered his appearance. This was mailed 
to Mr. Hatch in December, 1973, upon his request (Tr. 
32, 33, 34). Also, see Affidavit of the plaintiff (Tr. 36), 
and the affidavit of her attorney (Tr. 39). The defendant 
was therefore fully aware of the terms and provisions of 
the Decree of Divorce entered on November 20, 1973, 
and when he failed and refused to answer during the inter-
locutory period, the matter became res ad judicata. We 
call the Court's attention to Rule 60-B: 
"The Motion be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons 1, 2, 3, and 4, not more than three 
months after the judgment Order or proceeding 
was entered or taken." 
We are aware that the matter of alimony and sup-
port money may be modified upward or downward by 
the Court with a change of circumstances and financial 
conditions of the parties. However, plaintiff, after the 
three months' period has elapsed, obtains an absolute 
property right in the real and personal property. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDIC-
TION TO CHANGE ITS DECREE AS TO THE 
REAL PROPERTY INVOLVED SINCE WHEN THE 
DECREE BECAME ABSOLUTE AND FINAL, THE 
INTEREST OF THE PARTIES VESTED IN THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
After the three-month interlocutory period had 
elapsed, the Court was without jurisdiction to set aside 
the Decree as to the award of real property. Under 
Rule 60(b), defendant's only remedy would be an at-
tempt to set aside the Decree and Judgment by a sepa-
rate action upon the showing of fraud. With all the notice 
and awareness that defendant and his attorney had 
during the interlocutory period, it is inconceivable that 
defendant could claim fraud. As to his affidavits which 
are firmly disputed, we submit defendant or his attorney 
had a duty to make some sort of motion to set aside or 
modify the Decree rather than oral requests which plain-
tiff and her counsel both refused. 
See Anderson vs. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277 (282 
P.2d 845, 847) and Masters v. Le Seuer, 373 P.2d 573, 
13 Utah 2d 293. 
In Kettner vs. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382 (375 P.2d 28), 
the court said: 
"We are in accord with the proposition urged 
by the defendant that the trial Court has broad 
discretion in granting new trials, and in allowing 
relief under Rule 60(b). But its power is not with-
out limitation and cannot be exercised capriciously 
or arbitrarily. It is elementary that under usual 
circumstances the regular rules of procedure are 
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binding, and that a party who has allowed the 
time to move for a new trial to expire is there-
after precluded from doing so. This can be 
avoided only where it is made to appear that for 
one or more of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b) 
justice has been so thwarted that equity and good 
conscience demand that this extraordinary relief 
be granted. And the burden of showing facts to 
justify doing so is upon him who seeks such relief. 
"In order to warrant the granting of a new 
trial on the ground of belatedly discovered evi-
dence, relied on by the plaintiffs, it would have 
to appear both that it 'by due diligence could 
not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial'; and that such evidence was of suf-
ficient substance that there would be a reason-
able likelihood of a different result. Otherwise, it 
is obvious that the ends of justice would not be 
served by ordering a new trial. 
"Sparing the detail of plaintiffs5 affidavits, it 
is sufficient to say that any evidence referred to 
therein having any probative value on the dis-
puted issues appears to be so meager that we 
cannot believe there is any likelihood that it would 
produce a different result. But more significant, 
and of controlling importance, is the fact that 
no reason whatsoever is given to show why suuh 
evidence could not have been discovered in time 
to move for a new trial, nor in fact to have been 
presented on the original trial. Therefore, there 
existed no proper basis for granting relief under 
Rule 60(b)." 
In Board of Education of Granite School District 
vs. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385 (384 P.2d 806), it is stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
"Where defendant in his reasons for setting 
aside default judgment, asserted that the judg-
ment interest was based upon a void contract 
for the reason that the contract did not comply 
with the statue of frauds, such assertion went to 
the merit of he case and could not be considered 
on motion to set aside judgment." 
POINT III. 
THE COURT BY ITS ORDER AMENDING THE 
DECREE ARBITRARILY AND WITH NO REASON 
WHATSOEVER, CHANGED THE DECREE OF NO-
VEMBER 20, 1973, EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT'S 
INCOME HAD INCREASED. 
All of the evidence pointed to the fact that de-
fendant's salary had increased in the last year. Yet the 
Court took it upon itself to modify the Decree and cut 
the alimony and support money provision in half. There 
was no justification for the change. 
POINT IV. 
THERE WAS NO CONSENT OR AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES WHEREBY THE COURT 
COULD CONSIDER THAT PLAINTIFF HAD 
AGREED TO OR STIPULATED WITH DEFEND-
ANT TO THE CHANGING OF THE ORIGINAL 
DECREE. 
There was no agreement upon which the parties 
ever agreed to stipulate but it was an Order forced 
upon the plaintiff at the time of the hearing on August 
8, 1974 by the Court. 
Plaintiff on August 8th was present with her at-
torney. The Court hastily made changes which were not 
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agreed upon by plaintiff. Later plaintiff's attorney called 
to the Court's attention an obvious mistake in his cal-
culations of the amount of delinquency due under the 
former Order (Tr. 76). This was totally ignored, al-
though Judge Swan at the hearing on April 29, 1974 
stated that until there was a modification of the previ-
ous Order the amount would stand and defendant had 
a duty to comply with the Order. Notwithstanding the 
Court in its amended Order and Decree relieved defend-
ant of approximately $1,000 due and owing under the 
original decree. Therefore there was no mutual agree-
ment of the parties to which plaintiff at any time stipu-
lated. A stipulation has been defined as an agreement, 
admission or concession made in a judicial proceeding 
made by the parties or their attorneys. 50 Am. Jur. 609, 
par. 8: 
"As a general rule, stipulations should receive 
a fair and liberal construction, in harmony with 
the apparent intention of the parties and the spirit 
of justice, and in the furtherance of fair trials 
upon the merits, rather than a narrow and tech-
nical one calculated to defeat the purposes of 
their execution. The terms of a stipulation should 
not, however, be so construed as to extend beyond 
that which a fair construction justifies. In all cases 
of doubt, that construction should be adopted 
which is favorable to the party in whose favor it 
is made. A stipulation must be construed in the 
light of the circumstances surrounding the parties 
and in view of the result which they were attempt-
ing to accomplish. In seeking the intent of the 
parties the language used will not be so construed 
as to give it the effect of an admission of fact 
obviously intended to be controverted, or the 
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waiver of a right not plainly intended to be re-
linquished." 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court was 
without jurisdiction to set aside the Decree of Divorce; 
that the title to the real propery had become vested in 
the plaintiff; that the Court's reducing the amount of 
alimony and support money when the evidence actually 
showed an increase in the defendant's earnings and 
without any other showing was arbitrary and capricious. 
We submit that plaintiff is entitled to an Order 
from ths Court, vacating and setting aside the Amended 
Decree of Divorce and reinstating the Decree of Divorce 
with its original provisions as of November 20, 1973. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LA MAR DUNCAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
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